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W AT E R  L AW
Red River Shoot-out: Can Texas Divert Its Compact Authorized Share of a  
River from an Oklahoma Location in Violation of an Oklahoma Statute?
CASE AT A GLANCE 
Texas has rights to Red River water pursuant to the Red River Compact, approved by all basin states 
and Congress. Texas wants to divert a portion of its allocation in Oklahoma, which has passed a statute 
banning the export of water. This case will decide (1) whether Texas’s compact rights include the right to 
divert water in Oklahoma, and (2) whether Oklahoma’s effort to prohibit that diversion violates the Dormant 
Commerce Clause. 
Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann
Docket No. 11-889
Argument Date: April 23, 2013 
From: The Tenth Circuit
by Robert Abrams
Florida A&M University College of Law, Orlando, FL
ISSUES
Does the plain language of the Red River Compact allow petitioner 
to divert water included in Texas’s apportionment for Reach II, Sub-
basin 5 from within Oklahoma?
Does a congressionally approved multistate compact designed to 
ensure a share of water to each of the contracting states preempt 
state laws that obstruct co-compacting states from accessing their 
share of the allocated water from within the boundaries of another 
co-compacting state? 
If there is no such preemption, does the compact instead serve as a 
congressional authorization of those same state laws and thereby 
immunize them from scrutiny under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause?
FACTS
Tarrant Regional Water District (Tarrant) is a Texas state agency 
that provides water to north central Texas. It is responsible for sup-
plying water to nearly two million people in and near the Dallas-Fort 
Worth area, one of the fastest growing and most productive regions 
of the country. Tarrant anticipates that it will need an additional 
466,000 acre-feet of water per year to meet its projected demand in 
2060. This case arises from Tarrant’s efforts to satisfy this need with 
water of the Red River system diverted from a location in Oklahoma, 
which Tarrant claims is the most practical reliable source for supply-
ing its immediate and long-term water needs.
The Red River forms the boundary between southeastern Oklahoma 
and northeastern Texas. In 1955, Congress granted permission to 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas to negotiate an agree-
ment apportioning water in the Red River Basin. In 1978, the states 
signed the Red River Compact, and, in 1980, Congress ratified it. 
The compact divides the Basin into five reaches and further divides 
the reaches into Subbasins to allocate water. Critically, the main-
stem of the Red River is highly saline, although the parties dispute 
the degree of water quality impairment. The extent of the salinity 
makes it far preferable for water users, such as Tarrant, to divert 
the higher-quality water of tributaries before they enter the river’s 
mainstem and get mixed with the far more salty water flowing in 
the river’s mainstem. 
Tarrant sought to meet its water needs in several ways, each of 
which affected Oklahoma. In what has become the focus of this 
case, Tarrant seeks to export water to Texas from the Kiamichi 
River, an Oklahoma tributary of the Red River. That point of diver-
sion is located in Reach II of Subbasin 5 as defined by the Red River 
Compact. In an attempt to ensure meeting its water needs, Tarrant 
sought additional water not subject to the compact. Tarrant entered 
into an agreement with owners of groundwater rights in Stephens 
County, Oklahoma, to export groundwater from their property to 
Texas. Tarrant also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
with the Apache Tribe. Under the MOU, the parties agreed to work 
cooperatively to further quantify the Apache Tribe’s reserved water 
rights in Oklahoma and to develop mutually agreed terms for Tar-
rant’s use of certain amounts of such water by purchase or long-
term lease. 
Oklahoma requires a permit to appropriate water within the state, 
and the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB) is authorized 
to rule on permit applications. In this case, Tarrant filed permit 
applications for appropriations from Beaver Creek and Cache Creek, 
two Oklahoma streams located in another Reach of the river as 
defined by the compact and from the Kiamichi itself. In a series of 
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enactments, each adding ever more arduous hurdles for out-of-state 
diversions, Oklahoma statutes establish criteria that the OWRB 
must follow in deciding on applications. Some of the statutory provi-
sions under attack in this case were passed in 2009 after Tarrant 
had begun this litigation.
In November of 2007, Tarrant sued OWRB in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. It sought (1) a 
declaratory judgment that certain Oklahoma statutes are unconsti-
tutional and (2) an injunction to prevent the OWRB from applying 
the statutes to its Beaver Creek, Cache Creek, and Kiamichi River 
applications. The district court granted summary judgment for 
respondents in part and then dismissed the remaining claims on 
either standing or ripeness grounds. Tarrant appealed and the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision below. The Tenth 
Circuit concluded that Oklahoma may apply its laws to prevent Texas 
users such as Tarrant from acquiring any portion of Texas’s share 
of Subbasin 5 water from within physical boundaries of Oklahoma 
even if that water cannot be accessed from inside Texas’s border.
A full review of the Oklahoma statutes and the ways in which they 
attempt to thwart Texas withdrawals from Oklahoma territory can be 
found in the Tenth Circuit opinion, 656 F.3d 1222, 1129-30 (2011). 
These now include a required vote of approval by the Oklahoma leg-
islature. Since the Tenth Circuit decision was based on the ground 
that the compact governed and limited Texas’s right to acquire an 
Oklahoma point of diversion, the validity of those provisions, if 
they are subject to Dormant Commerce Clause attack, has not been 
addressed by any court and will almost certainly require remand 
to the district court for further proceedings. Although Tarrant also 
claimed that Oklahoma’s laws interfered with the attempt to obtain 
noncompact water (the groundwater and the water of the Apache 
Tribe), the Tenth Circuit affirmed that those claims lacked ripeness, 
rulings that are not within the grant of certiorari. Thus, none of the 
rulings below ever reached the constitutional merits of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause issue, leaving only matters of the effect of the 
compact before the Court.
CASE ANALYSIS
In the absence of the Red River Compact, this case would be decided 
under the Court’s “Dormant Commerce Clause” jurisprudence. 
To avoid balkanization of the United States as an economic unit, 
the Court throughout the twentieth century took on the role as a 
guardian against parochial and protectionist state or local regula-
tion that impeded the free flow of commerce among the states. In 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 487 U.S. 617 (1978), the Court declared 
that statutes which on their face discriminate against the inter-
state movement of commerce are “virtually per se invalid.” Then 
in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), the Court expressly 
extended the Dormant Commerce Clause to bans on the export 
of water. Sporhase left the door ajar, granting a small amount of 
leeway: if a demonstrably arid state could show the state as a whole 
was suffering water shortages that could be alleviated by intrastate 
transportation of the water, then it might be possible to uphold a 
narrowly tailored export ban.
The complicating factor here is the Red River Compact, which each 
party claims favors its position. It is important to note that interstate 
compacts, which owe their genesis to Article I, § 10, cl. 3 of the 
United States Constitution, are formed by the passage of compact 
legislation in each of the compacting states and to take effect must 
be ratified by Congress. For that reason, compacts hold a status as 
federal law which, under the Supremacy Clause, trumps state law 
to the contrary. Both sides argue that the compact addresses the 
place from which Texas and Texas parties may divert water awarded 
to Texas under the Red River Compact. Not surprisingly, Tarrant 
argues that the compact expressly contemplates Oklahoma points of 
withdrawal in Reach II, Subbasin 5. Respondents claim the com-
pact’s history requires it be read as forbidding Texas withdrawals 
from Oklahoma’s territory absent Oklahoma’s permission, which has 
not been granted. 
The compact adds a further wrinkle because as federal law, a com-
pact can serve as congressional authorization allowing the compact-
ing states to engage in conduct that otherwise would violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. The only previous case that has faced 
that issue squarely involved the Yellowstone River Compact, which 
included an express provision allowing export bans. In that case the 
district court upheld the export ban. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone 
River Compact Commission, 590 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mont. 1983). In the 
instant case, the parties again disagree, with Tarrant claiming that 
any intent to immunize the states from the Commerce Clause must 
be unmistakably clear on the face of the compact, and the Oklahoma 
water officials argue that the only fair inference regarding the 
compact’s intent is that its goal was to protect Oklahoma against 
invasive drafts on its streams.
Looking at some of the specifics, according to Tarrant and amici on 
its side, the plain language of the Red River Compact grants Texas 
a right to a portion of the water flowing into Reach II, Subbasin 5. 
Under § 5.05(b)(1), signatory states are granted “equal rights” to 
undesignated water flow in Subbasin 5 “so long as the flow of the 
Red River at the Arkansas–Louisiana boundary is 3,000 cubic feet 
per second (cfs).” They contend that the Tenth Circuit erroneously 
misapplied the presumption against preemption (of state law by 
federal law) and failed to adhere to a plain language reading of 
the compact. Tarrant points to the fact that in reference to some 
Reaches and Subbasins, the compact expressly indicated when 
water allocations were to be restricted to locations within each 
state’s boundaries, for example in regard to water use of Reach II, 
Subbasin 3 and Reach III, Subbasin 3. In contrast, § 5.05(b)(1) does 
not include restrictive language, which Tarrant claims requires the 
court to interpret § 5.05(b)(1) to permit Texas to obtain 25 percent 
of the water in excess of 3,000 cfs in Reach II, Subbasin 5 irrespec-
tive of state borders. Further supporting this position is the claim 
that Texas, due to the salinity of the flow in the mainstem and the 
comparatively lesser amount of tributary water on the Texas side of 
the river in that Subbasin, cannot satisfy its compact rights without 
making diversions from points located in Oklahoma. 
Respondents disagree with Tarrant’s interpretation of § 5.05(b)(1). 
Respondents argue that “equal rights” means signatory states 
have only “an equal right to use no more than 25 percent of excess 
water.” Respondents allege that 25 percent is a cap on potential  
removal and not an entitlement to a fixed 25 percent of undesig-
nated water by every signatory to the compact. Respondents further 
criticize Tarrant’s proposed methodology as cost prohibitive and 
difficult to quantify. To divide the excess flow equally, the signatory 
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states would have to determine the amount of excess flow and divide 
it by what share each state is owed. Respondents argue that such 
calculations are contrary to the compliance scheme of the compact, 
which does not include a fixed allocation scheme.
Focusing on the specific language, respondents assert that “Sec-
tion 5.05(b)(1) does not confer a cross-border right by omitting in 
express terms the obvious notion that States divert water within 
their borders.” They term the drafters inclusion and omission of 
border limitations in § 5.05 as “arbitrary” and not in derogation of 
the negotiating history that the respondents claim confirms that the 
states did not intend cross-border rights. 
The United States, as amicus, limits its attention to the compact 
interpretation issue and suggests that an interstate compact is “a 
contract … that must be construed and applied in accordance with 
its terms.” Based on the text of the Red River Compact and the 
record developed in this case, the United States urges that the bet-
ter interpretation is that Oklahoma may not categorically foreclose 
Texas from diverting water in Reach II, Subbasin 5 of the Red River 
in Oklahoma, at least where such a prohibition would prevent Texas 
from exercising its “equal right” under § 5.05(b)(1) of the compact 
to use excess water in that Subbasin.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Court is faced with an issue of interstate water compact inter-
pretation. Historically, the Court has been very careful to consider 
such compacts on their own terms, much like a matter of contract 
interpretation because compacts are state agreements ratified by 
Congress, and to do otherwise would raise separation of powers 
concerns. For that reason, the Court may treat this as a Red-River-
Compact-only matter, in which case the precedential value would 
be somewhat limited (despite the parties’ claims that no less than 3 
percent of the nation’s economy, the future of northeast Texas, and 
the ecology of the entire state of Oklahoma, hang in the balance). If 
the Court takes that path, a great deal of effort will be made to parse 
the compact and the understandings it was meant to embody. By  
engaging in that detailed compact-specific inquiry, the breadth of 
the precedent is more limited; there will be less likelihood that the 
case will affect the interpretations given, or rights created, by other 
interstate water compacts. An affirmance will force Tarrant and 
Texas to figure out another way to develop a larger portion of their 
share of Red River water. The Court could reverse in one of two 
ways. First and resulting in an immediate victory for Tarrant, the 
Court could find both that the compact permits cross-border diver-
sions in Reach II Subbasin 5 and that the compact preempts export-
restrictive state laws. Alternatively, the Court could limit its ruling to 
the compact cross-border diversion issue and rule that the compact 
neither preempts nor immunizes the Oklahoma state laws in rela-
tion to Dormant Commerce Clause challenges. In that event, the 
case would be remanded with instructions to consider the Dormant 
Commerce Clause attacks on the restrictive Oklahoma measures.
An alternative possibility is that the Court decides the case on a 
broader ground that addresses the presumptions applied to all inter-
state water compacts, of which there are roughly 50, slightly more 
than half of which play a major role in interstate water allocation or 
management. A broad answer favoring respondents might declare 
that absent express provisions in the compact, water allocated  
to a state may be diverted in another state’s territory only with  
permission. A broad answer favoring petitioner might be that, 
absent express provisions in the compact, a state is entitled to 
divert its allocated share from whatever point of diversion is most 
efficacious, consistent with reasonable nondiscriminatory regula-
tion of the state in which the diversion is effectuated. Even if great 
emphasis is placed on the compact’s text, but little on its history and 
the parties’ intent, the ruling might have broader significance. An 
amicus counted as many as nine water allocation compacts having 
similar language to that of the Red River Compact (although none 
have language quite like § 5.05(b)(1)).
Robert Abrams is a professor of law at the Florida A&M University 
College of Law. He is coauthor of one of the leading casebooks  
on Water Law and a vice-chair of the ABA Water Resources Com-
mittee. He can be reached at rabrams@eprentise.com. Professor 
Abrams was assisted in the preparation of this PREVIEW article by 
Victoria Orero and Elizabeth Nakagoshi, both 3L students at the 
College of Law.
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In March, the Court heard a number of interesting cases. Below, we highlight some of the more 
engaging comments between the justices and the advocate during United States v. Windsor 
(Docket No. 12-307). Windsor asks whether the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which 
for federal benefit purposes defines marriage as being between a man and a woman, violates 
the Equal Protection Clause; there were also standing issues before the Court given that the 
petition was brought to the Court not by the executive branch but rather by a bipartisan group 
of House of Representative leaders. 
CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS: I would have thought your  
answer would be that the Executive’s obligation to execute 
the law includes the obligation to execute the law consistent 
with the Constitution. And if he has made a determination that 
executing the law by enforcing the terms is unconstitutional, I 
don’t see why he doesn’t have the courage of his convictions 
and execute not only the statute, but do it consistent with his 
view of the Constitution, rather than saying, oh, we’ll wait till the 
Supreme Court tells us we have no choice.
MS. VICKI JACKSON (court-appointed amicus): Mr. Chief 
Justice, I think that’s a hard question under Article II. But I think 
the Article III questions that this Court is facing turn on what the 
parties in the case have alleged, what relief they’re seeking, and 
what the posture is.
JUSTICE ANTHONY KENNEDY: In Federal court’s jurisprudence, 
are you saying there’s a lack of adversity here?
MS. JACKSON: I am saying primarily …
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Can you give us a pigeonhole?
MS. JACKSON: I—it’s a little difficult because the circumstance 
is unusual, Justice Kennedy, but I think the most apt of the doc-
trines, although they are overlapping and reinforce each other, 
the most apt is standing. This Court has made clear that a party 
on appeal has to meet the same Article III standing requirements 
of injury caused by the action complained of and redressable by 
the relief requested by the parties.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: But it seems to me there—there’s injury 
here. 
MS. JACKSON: Well, Your Honor, I do not agree that the injuries 
alleged by the United States should be cognizable by the Article 
III courts because those injuries are exactly what it asked the 
courts below to—to produce. 
 *  *  *  *
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, it [DOMA] applies to over what, 1,100 
Federal laws, I think we are saying. So it’s not—it’s—it’s—I 
think there is quite a bit to your argument that if the tax deduc-
tion case, which is specific, whether or not if Congress has the 
power it can exercise it for the reason that it wants, that it likes 
some marriage it does like, I suppose it can do that. But when 
it has 1,100 laws, which in our society means that the Federal 
government is intertwined with the citizens’ day-to-day life, you 
are at—at real risk of running in conflict with what has always 
been thought to be the essence of the State police power, which 
is to regulate marriage, divorce, custody.
MR. PAUL CLEMENT (on behalf of respondent Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group): Well, Justice Kennedy, two points. First of all, 
the very fact that there are 1,100 provisions of Federal law that 
define the terms “marriage” and “spouse” goes a long way to 
showing that Federal law has not just stayed completely out of 
these issues. It’s gotten involved in them in a variety of contexts 
where there is an independent Federal power that supported 
that. Now, the second thing is the fact that DOMA affects all 
1,100 statutes at once is not really a sign of its irrationality. It 
is a sign that what it is, and all it has ever purported to be, is 
a definitional provision. And like every other provision in the 
Dictionary Act, what it does is it defines the term wherever it  
appears in Federal law in a consistent way. And that was part 
and parcel of what Congress was trying to accomplish with 
DOMA in 1996.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but it’s not really uniformity because it 
regulates only one aspect of marriage. It doesn’t regulate all of 
marriage.
MR. CLEMENT: Well, that’s true but I don’t think that’s a mark 
against it for federalism purposes. And it—it addressed a par-
ticular issue at a point, remember in 1996, Congress is address-
ing this issue because they are thinking that the State of Hawaii, 
(continued on page 303)
